Why Cannabis Commercialization Wins

Taking the 'other side' of Ezra Klein.

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I wrote this detailed letter to Ezra Klein in response to his well-publicized statement that “commercialized cannabis, which I very much supported, is probably a bad idea.”

Ezra,

I have worked in the commercial cannabis industry for nearly a decade through my firm Ananda Strategy, which advises many of the leading operators in the US cannabis space.

I am writing in response to your recent comments suggesting that, although you once supported cannabis legalization, you now believe that “commercialization is probably a bad idea.”

I want to begin by saying that I have long admired your work—your intellectual honesty, your ability to synthesize complex issues, and your ongoing effort to align public policy with empirical reality.

You have consistently encouraged your audience to re-examine assumptions, to ground debates in data rather than intuition, and to ensure that public institutions remain responsive to democratic will.

It is precisely because I value your commitment to these principles that I believe your recent conclusion on cannabis commercialization deeply misses the mark.

Over the past decade, we have accumulated a substantial body of empirical evidence on cannabis legalization—perhaps more than on any major social change in recent policy history.

The results overwhelmingly contradict the notion that commercialization is harmful.

Nowhere is this clearer than in Canada, which offers the most comprehensive and instructive case study of nationwide legalization under a tightly regulated model.

Since legal sales began in October 2018, Canada has achieved what policymakers around the world hoped legalization could deliver.

Youth cannabis use has not risen. In fact, StatsCan surveys show that underage cannabis use has declined as illicit-market penetration decreased and sales by legal actors increased.

Between 2018 and 2023, legal cannabis captured the majority of sales nationwide, rising from roughly 25 percent of the market in the first year to well over two-thirds by year five.

This transition from illicit to regulated channels has brought with it precisely the benefits legalization was intended to produce: tested and accurately labeled products, reductions in organized-crime involvement, and improved consumer safety.

Public-health indicators have also remained stable. Comprehensive analyses by provincial health agencies—such as those in Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta—have found no significant increase in cannabis-related hospitalizations or emergency department visits when adjusted for population growth and improved reporting.

At the national level, legalization has produced meaningful shifts in substitution behavior.

Alcohol consumption, particularly among younger adults, has declined in Canada in ways that mirror trends observed in U.S. legalization states.

Early evidence also suggests that medical and non-medical cannabis access has reduced opioid prescribing in certain regions, echoing well-documented findings from states such as Colorado, Oregon, and Washington.

These developments matter because alcohol misuse and opioid-related harms are among the most significant drivers of healthcare expenditures in North America.

To the extent legalization diverts consumption away from substances with far higher morbidity and mortality, it is difficult to see these trends as anything other than a major public-health success.

Your concerns seem to rest in part on a broader skepticism of commercial incentives, and I understand why.

American history is filled with examples of industries (tobacco, pharmaceuticals, processed food) leveraging marketing and political influence in ways that damage public well-being.

However, cannabis commercialization is not analogous to these cases. It is already subject to one of the strictest regulatory architectures of any legal consumer product.

Advertising is severely restricted. Packaging must be child-resistant, opaque, and stripped of promotional appeal.

Potency, contaminants, and cannabinoid content must be tested and disclosed. Retail access is controlled through licensing, zoning, and track-and-trace systems that resemble pharmaceutical supply-chain protocols more than beverage alcohol.

If commercialization were truly the core problem, we would expect to see large-scale public-health deterioration in jurisdictions that adopted this model.

But that deterioration has not occurred.

Your argument also raises questions of consistency.

The U.S. commercializes alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and ultra-processed foods, which are products whose social and medical costs dwarf those of cannabis.

Tobacco kills half a million Americans each year; alcohol contributes to hundreds of thousands of deaths and billions in healthcare spending; ultra-processed foods are driving an epidemic of metabolic disease.

Against this backdrop, cannabis—whether one supports or opposes its use—does not inhabit the same risk category.

To single it out as uniquely unsuitable for commercialization runs counter to long-standing regulatory logic and to your own arguments in other policy areas where you have emphasized proportionality, evidence, and harm reduction.

One of the most important public-health arguments for commercialization is its effect on substance substitution.

Numerous peer-reviewed studies documented reductions in alcohol consumption following legalization, particularly among younger adults.

Opioid prescriptions decrease meaningfully when cannabis becomes accessible. States such as Colorado and Oregon have reported declines in workers’ compensation claims and workplace injury rates—an outcome associated with reduced alcohol use and improved pain management options.

Even if cannabis is not a universal substitute, its availability appears to mitigate some of the harms associated with substances that impose far greater costs on the healthcare system.

Concerns about potency, which you have echoed, are understandable but historically recurrent.

For decades, critics have insisted that contemporary cannabis is unprecedentedly strong, even though high-potency varieties have existed for generations.

The key difference is that commercial markets provide transparency.

Consumers can titrate with precision because products are labeled, tested, and consistent. Eliminating commercialization would not eliminate potency; it would eliminate labeling, standardization, and testing—precisely the mechanisms that ensure safe use.

What strikes me most, however, is that your remarks largely sidestep the central issue of federal scheduling.

Cannabis remains a Schedule I substance, a classification that requires the gov’t to assert that it has “no accepted medical use” and a “high potential for abuse.”

Whatever one believes about commercialization, Schedule I status is indefensible by any reasonable interpretation of contemporary science.

You have emphasized throughout your career that public policy must acknowledge empirical truth, even when institutions resist updating archaic frameworks.

Here, the empirical truth is overwhelmingly clear, and the necessary institutional change—rescheduling—is a prerequisite for any responsible national conversation about cannabis.

Finally, there is the matter of democracy.

Legal cannabis is one of the most popular policy reforms in the United States.

It has passed repeatedly at the ballot box, in states of every ideological composition. Support consistently ranges between 65 and 70 percent nationally.

When voters speak so uniformly on an issue centered on personal autonomy, public health, and the criminal-legal system, dismissing commercialization implies that democratic preferences are secondary to paternalistic concerns.

That stance is difficult to reconcile with your long-standing commitment to strengthening democratic institutions and legitimacy.

For all these reasons, I believe that your recent conclusion—that commercialization is a bad idea—is inconsistent with the best available evidence, with comparative international outcomes, and with the values you have consistently championed.

A well-regulated commercial model remains the most pragmatic, equitable, and empirically grounded approach for managing a substance that millions of adults already choose to use.

The real work ahead lies in refining these regulatory frameworks, ensuring federal rescheduling, and continuing to gather and analyze data—not abandoning commercialization altogether.

I offer this perspective with respect for your contributions to public dialogue and with appreciation for your willingness to revisit old assumptions.

In this instance, however, the evidence suggests a different conclusion than the one you reached, and I believe it is important that the public conversation reflects the full scope of what we now know.

This is Third-Party content and does not reflect (or not not reflect) the views of Cannabis Confidential or CB1 Capital.

Hirsh Jain is the CEO of Ananda Strategy, a cannabis-focused business advisory firm that works with cannabis brands, retailers, distributors, technology platforms and other businesses on matters ranging from competitive licensing, legislative strategy, regulatory intelligence, market expansion, business litigation, internal & external communication and other varied corporate initiatives.